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WHO WILL PROTECT THE POLICE? A NEED
FOR TASK SPECIALIZATION IN LOWER
COURTS: MALLEY v. BRIGGS
Qualified immunity' is an affirmative defense available to a public
official charged with an unconstitutional deprivation of rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.2 Federal courts adopted the law of qualified immunity
to balance two competing goals: deterring officials from abusing their
power in derogation of the Constitution, and shielding officials from
the threat of potential liability while performing discretionary duties.3
1. Qualified immunity is one of three types of defenses raised in civil rights litiga-
tion: sovereign immunity, which bars suits against the states; absolute immunity, which
bars suits against the President, legislators, judges, and prosecutors acting within their
official capacities; and qualified immunity, which is available to certain other public
officials upon a showing that they have acted in good faith.
2. Enacted by the Forty-Second Congress as Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, rather it only creates a right of
action to vindicate those rights already conferred by the Constitution or by federal stat-
ute. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979). Section 1983 is "not itself a
source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere con-
ferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it de-
scribes." Id. at 144 n.3; see also P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 47-51 (1983)
(discusses the historical development of § 1983).
Although Congress originally enacted § 1983 to enforce the provisions of the four-
teenth amendment and to protect the constitutional rights of black citizens in the South
during the Reconstruction, its remedial function has been expanded to encompass viola-
tions of any substantive right secured by the Constitution or federal law. See Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (recognizing a right of action under § 1983 for a viola-
tion of a federal statute). See also S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION 3-4 (1979).
3. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-42, 245-48 (1974) (pointing out injus-
tice of subjecting to liability officials who must exercise discretion in performing their
jobs); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-07 (1978) (notwithstanding importance of
redress for civil rights violations, public policy dictates limited immunity for federal
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Presently, qualified immunity will shield a public official only when his
alleged misconduct was objectively reasonable.4 In Malley v. Briggs5
the Supreme Court restricted use of the qualified immunity defense.
The Court held that a police officer, whose request for a warrant led to
an unconstitutional arrest, may be liable under section 1983 unless he
proves that his conduct, notwithstanding prior judicial determination
of probable cause, was objectively reasonable. 6
In Malley v. Briggs a Rhode Island state trooper, after conducting a
narcotics investigation, applied for arrest warrants charging the re-
spondents7 with possession of drugs.8 A state district court judge
executives); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-15 (1982)(in determining extent of
immunity it is necessary to balance need for redress for civil rights violations against
cost to society of suits against public officials). See also Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald:
The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section
1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 913-15 (1984); (discussion of policies behind the qualified
immunity defense); Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of
Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, 128 (1985).
4. The Supreme Court developed the standard of "objective reasonableness" in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying
text. A number of articles address the effect of Harlow's adoption of a purely objective
standard of qualified immunity. See Comment, supra note 3 (analyzing how courts
should apply the objective standard); Comment, Rejecting Absolute Immunity for Fed-
eral Officials, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1707 (1983) (proposing that courts extend the Harlow
qualified immunity standard to all government officials to promote uniform treatment);
Comment, Entity and Official Immunities Under 42 U.S.C, Section 1983: The Supreme
Court Adopts a Solely Objective Test, 28 S.D.L. REV. 337 (1983) (discussing how Harlow
modified the basic nature of the qualified immunity defense); Note, supra note 3 (argu-
ing that Harlow standard inquiry should be restructured to enable courts to resolve legal
and factual questions of an official's immunity separately).
5. 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986).
6. Id. at 1099.
7. The respondents herein, James and Louisa Briggs, were a prominent couple in
their Rhode Island community. Id. at 1095.
8. Id. at 1094. In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police conducted a court-
authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll, a friend of the Briggs' daughter.
Id.
At 5:30 p.m. on December 20, 1980, Paul Driscoll received a call from a male identi-
fied by the name "Dr. Shogun." Id. The officers recorded a general conversation about
a party the conversants had attended the previous night, which contained in pertinent
part the following: "This is Dr. Shogun ... I can't believe I was toking in front of
Jimmy Briggs ....." Id. The caller also stated that he "passed it to Louisa." Id. Paul
Driscoll stated later in the conversation, "Nancy was sitting in his lap rolling her
thing." Id. The police recorded a second call received by Paul Driscoll at 5:56 p.m. the
same evening. The caller and Paul Driscoll talked about a party they were going to
attend that night at the Briggs' home. Id. at 1099. The state trooper inferred from the
log that the Briggs were hosting a marijuana party. Id. at 1094.
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signed the warrants and the state trooper arrested the respondents.9
When the grand jury did not return an indictment, the State subse-
quently dropped the charges."° Thereafter, the respondents instituted
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the state trooper vio-
lated their fourth and fourteenth amendment rights in applying for the
arrest warrants.11 The District Court for the District of Rhode Island
held that the judicially authorized arrest warrent served to insulate the
officer from liability.2 The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 3
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that judicial
approval 14 of an arrest warrant did not serve as an absolute bar to the
9. Id. at 1095. The state trooper prepared felony complaints charging the Briggs
with possession of marijuana. Id. The officer presented the complaints to a state dis-
trict court judge, accompanied by unsigned arrest warrants for each respondent's arrest
and supporting affidavits describing the two intercepted phone calls and the state
trooper's interpretation of the calls. Id. Malley included a statement that he thought
the conversation referred to a marijuana cigarette being passed around and additional
marijuana cigarettes being rolled for further consumption by Dr. Shogun, Paul Driscoll,
and Louisa Briggs. Id. at 1099 n.2.
The police arrested the Briggs' at 6:00 a.m. on March 19, 1981. Id. at 1095. The
police took the Briggs' to the police station where they were booked, held for several
hours, arraigned, and released. Id. Local and statewide newspapers learned of the
Briggs' arrest and published the fact that the prominent Rhode Island couple had been
arrested and charged with possession of drugs. Id.
10. Id. The state police successfully sought 20 additional arrest warrants in connec-
tion with the narcotics investigation. The record before the Court, however, did not
disclose how many of those warrants resulted in indictments. Id. at 1099 n.1.
11. 105 S. Ct. at 1095. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the scope of § 1983.
Both Louisa and James Briggs sought one million dollars in compensatory damages and
one million dollars in punitive damages. Id. at 1100 n.3.
12. 106 S. Ct. at 1095. At the close of the Briggs' evidence, the court granted
Trooper Malley a directed verdict. Id. The district court reasoned that the judge's
authorization and issuance of the warrant broke the causal chain between Trooper Mal-
ley's filing of a complaint and the Briggs' arrest. Id. The district court applied the
Harlow standard of objective reasonableness and found that Malley, by believing that
the facts alleged in his affidavit were true and submitting them to a neutral magistrate,
was entitled to immunity. Id.
13. Id. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held
that immunity did not extend to officers who seek arrest warrants unless they have an
objectively reasonable basis for believing that the facts alleged in the supporting affidavit
are sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. See Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715 (1st
Cir. 1984).
14. Court opinions use the words "magistrate" and "judicial officer" interchangea-
bly. 106 S. Ct. at 1101 n.5. For purposes of this Comment, "magistrate" and "judicial
officer" will be used interchangeably, and will refer to the court official who issues arrest
warrants and search warrants.
1987]
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civil rights liability of the police officer who obtained the warrant. 15
Congress enacted section 1983 to provide a right of action for parties
deprived of their constitutional or federal statutory rights by actions
taken "under color of" state law. 6 Section 1983, therefore, holds pub-
lic officials who violate an individual's fourteenth amendment rights
liable for that violation. 7 On its face, sectibn 1983 does not provide
for either qualified or absolute immunity.1 8 In an effort to curb the
increase in section 1983 litigation, however, courts have construed the
statute to incorporate traditional common law immunities.19 Qualified
immunity thus developed as an affirmative defense available to public
officials in section 1983 cases. 20
15. Id. at 1099.
16. See supra note 2 for a discussion of § 1983. The phrase "under color of" covers
actions authorized by state law and by abuses of power made while the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law. See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.
1965), Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1985).
17. See supra note 2 for a discussion of § 1983. See generally Kates & Kouba,
Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 131 (1972) (types of § 1983 suits allowed despite municipal immunity).
18. See supra note 2.
19. See supra note I for the three categories of common law immunities. Although
the language of § 1983 does not provide immunities, the Supreme Court did not hesitate
to find that Congress did not intend to eviscerate traditionally recognized immunities.
"The Supreme Court has read § 1983 as incorporating common law immunities when it
finds that the 'same considerations of public policy that underlie the common law rule
likewise countenance [the] immunity under § 1983.'" Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 613
F.2d 245, 248 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976)).
See generally Note, Federalism, Section 1983 and State Law Remedies: Curtailing the
Federal Civil Rights Docket by Restricting the Underlying Right, 43 U. PITr. L. REV.
1035 (1982) (analysis of the Supreme Court's efforts to limit use of § 1983); Comment,
supra note 3, at 902 n.3.
20. A government official is personally responsible for suits against him in his indi-
vidual capacity. In an effort to protect officials from such liability, the Court afforded
them various immunities. See, eg., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges
absolutely immune when acting within their jurisdiction); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976) (prosecutors held absolutely immune when advocating for the state); Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges absolutely immune when acting within their juris-
dictions); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislator's statement qualifies as
privileged information in a legislative proceeding).
The Court has accorded to various other officials a qualified "good faith" immunity.
See Butz v. Economou, 438, U.S. 478 (1978) (federal officials accorded qualified immu-
nity even when acting outside the scope of their authority); Procunier v. Navarette, 434
U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials who acted negligently accorded qualified immunity).
But see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1979) (municipality has no immu-
nity from § 1983 liability flowing from its constitutional violations); Comment, Owen v.
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In Pierson v. Ray2 the Supreme Court held that a public official,
sued under section 1983 but unable to claim absolute immunity, could
claim qualified immunity as a defense.22 The Court concluded that
Congress did not intend to annul the common law immunities tradi-
tionally granted to public officials, and permitted the policemen23 to
raise the common law defense of good faith and probable cause.24
Although Pierson acknowledged the qualified immunity defense, it did
not define the components of that defense.25
The Supreme Court extended its Pierson holding in Scheuer v.
Rhodes26 and attempted to define the elements of the good faith immu-
nity defense from section 1983 liability for high ranking officials.27 The
Court concluded that availability of the immunity defense would de-
pend upon the official's role and the circumstances surrounding his al-
leged misconduct.28 Although the Court did not define the extent of
the immunity available to state officials, the Court's language suggested
that the contents of the immunity analysis would encompass both ob-
jective and subjective factors.2 9
City of Independence: The Demise of Municipal Immunity, 21 URB. L. ANN. 241
(1981).
21. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
22. Id. at 557.
23. In Pierson the Court considered the immunity claims of Mississippi police of-
ficers charged with unlawfully arresting a group of black and white clergymen who
attempted to use segregated facilities in a bus station. Id. at 549.
24. The term "probable cause" for an arrest generally means probable cause to be-
lieve that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony. Prior to
issuance of an arrest warrant, a magistrate or judge must review the warrant application
and determine whether probable cause for arrest exists. Ultimately, issuance of a war-
rant is dependent upon his determination of probable cause. See, e.g., Whiteley v. War-
den of Wyoming Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
25. In lieu of ruling on the issue, the Court remanded for the lower court to deter-
mine whether the policemen could have reasonably believed the statute under which
they arrested the clergymen could have been valid. 386 U.S. at 557-58.
26. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
27. Id. at 234. In Scheuer the Governor of Ohio claimed that absolute immunity
protected him from liability for the deaths of four students at Kent State University
when he called in the National Guard to combat student demonstrations. Id.
28. Id. at 247-48.
29. Id. The terms "objective" and "subjective" are used frequently in qualified im-
munity discussions, but their meanings are often confused. One commentator has char-
acterized the "objective" inquiry as whether the defendant had "reasonable grounds
for ... belief in the legality of the challenged conduct" and "subjective" inquiry as to
whether the defendant had "good faith in fact." See S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 231.
The Supreme Court has defined the "objective" component as a "presumptive knowl-
1987]
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Responding to confusion in the lower federal courts regarding the
scope of the immunity articulated in Scheuer,30 the Court attempted in
Wood v. Strickland31 to further clarify the standard against which
courts should measure an official's conduct. This revised version of the
immunity standard, however, only added to the confusion by incorpo-
rating both objective and subjective factors.32 The objective prong of
the Wood standard required courts to focus upon whether the disputed
law was sufficiently clear that an officer knew or should have known his
conduct violated that law.33 The subjective prong required courts to
examine the official's motives and intentions.3 4 Usually, determina-
tions of whether an official had malicious intentions required full dis-
covery and a complete trial.3" This factual inquiry undermined the
edge of and respect for 'basic unquestioned constitutional rights."' Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1981) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
The Court defined the subjective element as referring to "permissible intentions." Id..
The Supreme Court eliminated the subjective element of immunity analysis, so courts
currently rely only on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct in determin-
ing § 1983 liability. Id. at 817-18. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for a
discusion of Harlow.
30. See Friedman, The Good Faith Defense in Constitutional Litigation, 5 HOFSTRA
L. REy. 501, 511-12 (1977) (discussing Scheuer and the ambiguities it left). "Did 'good
faith' mean that the government officials acted without malice or an evil intent, that
they affirmatively believed that they were acting within the law or the limits of their
authority, or that they were following what they thought were lawful orders of their
superiors?" Id.
31. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Petitioners in Wood were school board members claiming
immunity from a § 1983 suit by students expelled for violating certain regulations that
prohibited use or possession of alcohol at school or school activities. Id. at 309-11.
32. The Court ruled that good faith "necessarily contains elements of both" the
subjective and objective tests. Id. at 321.
33. Id. at 322. Wood's objective test differed significantly from the fact-oriented test
articulated in Scheuer. Under the Scheuer test, courts examined an official's reasonable-
ness within the light of the facts and their circumstances surrounding each case. 416
U.S. at 249-50. Under the Wood test, the Court sought to measure an officials' reasona-
bleness against the degree to which the law in question was knowable. 420 U.S. at 322.
See Comment, supra note 3, at 909-12; see also The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89
HARV. L. REV. 49, 219-25 (1975) (comparing Wood and Scheuer).
34. 420 U.S. at 322.
35. This was a factual inquiry. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 dictates that a motion for sum-
mary judgment may be granted only if "there is no question of any material
fact ... and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law."
The determination of an official's subjective intent often involves questions of fact, thus
the granting of summary judgment is rare. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-17
(1981); Halpern v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 713
(1981).
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original purpose of the qualified immunity doctrine, which was to de-
crease the federal caseload and protect public officials from frivolous
litigation brought under section 1983.36
In the landmark case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald37 the Supreme Court
reformulated the good faith immunity standard by eliminating the sub-
jective element of the test. 3' The Court noted that courts can rarely
decide questions of subjective intent by summary judgment.39 Further-
more, the Court held that an official, performing discretionary duties,
is immune from liability unless the official's conduct violated clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable of-
ficer would have known.' Under the Harlow standard, immunity is
lost when no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a
warrant should issue.41 Although the Court specified that the thresold
36. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See generally Comment, supra note
3, at 913-15 (discussion of policies underlying the qualified immunity defense).
Although the facts of Wood limited its holding specifically to the context of school
discipline, subsequent cases quoted the Wood test as the general standard of qualified
immunity. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139 (1979); Procunier v. Nava-
rette, 434 U.S. 555, 562-66 (1978); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 484 (1978).
37. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow petitioner A. Ernest Fitzgerald alleged unlaw-
ful discharge from employment with the Department of Air Force. Id. at 802. Peti-
tioner accused respondents, White House aides to former President Nixon, with
conspiracy to violate petitioner's constitutional rights and brought suit under § 1983.
Id.
38. Id. at 815-18. Harlow was a triumph for § 1983 defendants and is considered a
landmark case because it held that the state of mind of the defendant is irrelevant with
respect to qualified immunity. Id. Thus, a defendant could commit a malicious act
against a plaintiff and still enjoy qualified immunity provided no established constitu-
tional right that the official should have known applied to the misconduct existed. See
supra note 4 for a discussion of the objective element in qualified immunity.
39. 457 U.S. at 818. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
40. 457 U.S. at 818-19. In Harlow the § 1983 qualified immunity analysis focused
on the law as of the time of the alleged constitutional violation. Id. at 818.
41. Id. at 815-19. The Harlow opinion explicitly pointed out that the reason for the
new qualified immunity doctrine is to foster the resolution of § 1983 cases by way of
motions to dismiss, and obviate the necessity for discovery. Id. at 817-18. According to
the Harlow Court, this will result in less pressure on government officials and will pre-
vent § 1983 from intimidating governmental decision-making. Id. at 819.
Several circuits, nonetheless, have held that pretrial orders denying qualified immu-
nity could not be appealed immediately by defendant public officials. These courts as-
serted that the immunity issue was a factual inquiry that was inseparable from the
merits of a plaintiff's actions. See Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir.
1984). But see McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[W]e
believe that appellate review of a denial of a motion for summary disposition must be
available to ensure that government officials are fully protected against unnecessary tri-
als under qualified immunity on the same basis as for absolute immunity.").
1987]
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immunity question is an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the
officer's conduct, the Court gave little guidance to district courts on
how to conduct such an examination.42
Applying the Harlow standard in United States v. Leon,43 the
Supreme Court set forth guidelines for the lower courts and articulated
what constitutes objectively reasonable behavior.' In defining the pa-
rameters of reasonable behavior, the Court examined the respective
roles of a police officer and a magistrate in the warrant issuing pro-
cess.41 While acknowledging faults in the magistrate's performance of
his administrative duties, the Court nonetheless focused on police mis-
42. The Harlow Court refused to rule on the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment and instead remanded the case for further factual findings regarding whether a
constitutional basis for plaintiff's dismissal existed. 457 U.S. at 819-20. Because the
Court remanded, it never applied its new standard and, therefore, the lower courts had
no guidance on how to apply that standard. See supra note 4 for a discussion of the
Harlow standard.
43. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon police officers executed a search warrant based
upon informant and surveillance information and found large quantities of drugs and
other evidence. Id. at 901-02. The district court granted defendant Leon's motion to
suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant, concluding that the affidavit
was insufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 903. The court of appeals affirmed.
Id. at 904. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 926. The Court held that the exclusion-
ary rule should not bar the use of evidence at trial obtained by officers acting in reason-
able reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, but
ultimately found to be invalid. Id. at 913-23.
Although Leon concerns search warrants, not arrest warrants, the procedure for ob-
taining a search warrant is more or less the equivalent to the procedure for obtaining an
arrest warrant. An officer must obtain judicial or magisterial authorization supporting
probable cause and that the warrant should issue. See supra note 24 for a discussion of
probable cause.
44. 468 U.S. at 925-26.
45. Id. at 913-25. The Leon Court stressed the great importance of magisterial re-
view of search warrants to determine whether the probable cause exists. Id. at 914. The
Court stated that the need for magisterial authorization of a search warrant stems from
the superior knowledge of a magistrate regarding when probable cause exists, and
fourth amendment law in general. Id. at 913-16. The Court further stated that magiste-
rial review of warrants is necessary due to the hurried and pressured nature of an inves-
tigating police officer. Id. at 914. The Court explained that an officer does not always
have the time to reflect fully on his evidence to determine whether his evidence is suffi-
cient to establish probable cause. Id. at 913-14. More significantly, the Leon Court
pointed out the importance that a magistrate perform his neutral and discretionary du-
ties to the best of his ability, so he does not just serve as merely a "rubber-stamp" for
police. Id. at 914. See generally Note, The Implications of Leon in the Aftermath of
Gates: the Good Faith Exception in Cases Involving Reliance on Warrants Issued on the
Basis of Hearsay Information, 49 ALBANY L. REV. 1032 (1985); McCoy, The Good-
Faith Warrant Cases-What Price Judge Shopping?, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 53 (1985). See,
e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
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conduct.4 6 The Court conceded that a warrant issued by a magistrate
normally suffices to establish that the officer acted reasonably and in
good faith in requesting for a search warrant.47 Citing Harlow, how-
ever, the Court remarked that the officer's reliance on the magistrate's
probable cause determination must be objectively reasonable.4" The
Court concluded that the appropriate inquiry in evaluating an officer's
conduct is whether a well-trained police officer, as well as the magis-
trate, had an objectively reasonable belief that probable cause to con-
duct a search existed. 49
In Malley v. Briggs5" the Supreme Court concluded that a police
officer who improperly applies for an arrest warrant is not immune
from liability under section 1983 even though the judge issuing the
warrant has determined that probable cause exists. 5 Justice White,
writing the majority opinion, discussed the applicability not only of
qualified, but of absolute immunity for defendant police officers in sec-
tion 1983 suits.52
The Court initially addressed the state trooper's contention that the
Court should grant a police officer absolute immunity from liability for
damages because his role in seeking arrest warrants is similar to that of
a prosecutor.- 3 Rejecting this argument, the Court noted that its previ-
(1979); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
46. For a critical analysis of how the Leon Court artfully glossed over the issue of
magisterial misconduct, see generally McCoy, supra note 45, at 56. McCoy criticized
the Leon Court as having "judicial tunnel vision" regarding the laxity with which fellow
judges issue warrants. Id. He suggested that task specialization in local courts would
be a remedy to deficiencies in the warrant issuing process. Id. at 65.
47. 468 U.S. at 922 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823, n.32 (1982)).
48. Id. at 922-23. The Court further clarified the parameters of the Harlow "objec-
tive reasonableness" test.
49. Id. at 926.
50. 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986).
51. Id. at 1099.
52. The Court discussed the origins of both qualified and absolute immunity in re-
sponse to Malley's assertions that he was entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 1095-96.
53. Officer Malley urged that his role as police officer requesting a warrant is similar
to the role of a prosecutor asking a grand jury to indict a suspect. Id. at 1096. A
prosecutor has absolute immunity, and Malley asserted he too should receive the same
degree of immunity. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (granting abso-
lute immunity to prosecutors).
The state trooper also contended that he was entitled to absolute immunity because
his role in seeking arrest warrants is similar to that of a complaining witness. 106 S. Ct.
at 1096. Rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that it looks to common law
1987]
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ous interpretations of section 1983 gave absolute immunity only to
functions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process. 4 Thus, the majority distinguished between a police officer
and a prosecutor or a judge, asserting that liability would impair the
performance of the latter two, while not impairing an officer's perform-
ance.55 The majority reasoned that the judicial system would benefit
from a rule of qualified rather than absolute immunity for police of-
ficers by prompting more thoughtful reflection prior to application for
a warrant.
5 6
The Court next turned to the officer's contention that he was entitled
to qualified immunty because applying to a magistrate for authoriza-
tion of an arrest warrant is per se objectively reasonable. 7 Extending
its Leon 5' holding, the Court stated that the pertinent question is
whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that his
affidavit failed to establish probable cause, despite the magistrate's au-
thorization. 9 The majority reasoned that an officer should not rely on
the magistrate's determinations because a magistrate may fail to per-
form competently due to docket pressures.60 The Court concluded
that if a magistrate inappropriately issues a warrant, an officer cannot
excuse his own default by pointing to the greater incompetence of the
counterparts to determine the extent of immunity, if any, that an official will receive.
Id. The Court pointed out that a complaining witness is not absolutely immune at
common law and, therefore, neither is the state trooper. Id. The Court explained that
policy considerations do not require absolute immunity for officers applying for war-
rants, because the qualified immunity doctrine has developed to provide ample protec-
tion for all but the most unreasonable officers. Id.
54. Id. at 1097.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Court expressed that the threat of liability would encourage maximum
reflection by an officer before he applied for a warrant. Id.
57. Id. at 1098. Officer Malley asserted that applying to a magistrate for authoriza-
tion of an arrest warrant was per se objectively reasonable provided that he truly be-
lieved the facts alleged in his affidavit to be true. Id.
58. Leon, 468 U.S. at 897. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
59. 106 S. Ct. at 1098-99. The Court applied the reasoning found in Leon with
respect to the issuance of search warrants. Id. at 1098. The Court noted that the basic
principles underlying the search warrant procedure are the same as the arrest warrant
procedure. Id. The Court stated that application for a warrant is unreasonable only
when it is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the officer's belief in its
existence unreasonable. Id.
60. The Court implied that requiring higher standards for police officers applying
for warrants would help balance deficiencies in the magisterial review system. Id. at
1098-99.
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magistrate." Thus, the majority determined that the evidence must
establish whether the state trooper's conduct was in fact objectively
reasonable independent of the magistrate's authorization of the
warrant.62
Justice Powell dissented in part.63 Powell argued that in light of the
judge's determination of probable cause and the evidence of illegal ac-
tivity, the state trooper should be immune from damages." 4 Although
Powell agreed with the majority that the Harlow standard of objective
reasonableness applied, he disagreed with the Court's method of using
that standard.65  Initially, Powell contended that the Court errone-
ously failed to recognize that the officer's conduct met the requisite
standard of reasonableness. 66 Stating that a reasonably competent of-
ficer could have believed that a warrant should issue, Powell asserted
that the state trooper had satisfactorily met the Harlow standard.6 7
Powell's strongest dissention was that the Court misconstrued the re-
spective roles of, and the relationship between, the police officer and
the magistrate in the issuance of a warrant.6" Noting that the Court
consistently afforded great evidentiary weight to a magistrate's deter-
mination of probable cause, Powell inferred that the Court ignored its
precedent.69 Finally, Powell suggested that closer supervision or re-
moval of magistrates, rather than personal liability for police officers,
provides a more effective remedy for section 1983 violations.7"
61. Id. at 1099 n.9.
62. Id. at 1098.
63. Id. at 1099. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, wrote a separate opin-
ion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Justice Powell stated that the Court did not correctly evaluate the facts of the
case with respect to the Harlow standard of reasonableness. Id. at 1100-01. Justice
Powell asserted that the recorded conversations and Officer Malley's affidavit were suffi-
cient evidence that Officer Malley's request for an arrest warrant was in fact reasonable.
Id.
67. Id. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
68. Id. at 1101-02.
69. Id. Justice Powell pointed out that the Supreme Court has consistently empha-
sized the importance of a magistrate's determination of probable cause in search and
arrest warrant cases. Id. The majority in Afalley, Powell concludes, seems to denigrate
the relevance of the judge's determination of probable cause and his role in the issuance
of a warrant. Id. at 1102-03. See supra text accompanying note 47.
70. Id. at 1101 n.6. Quoting Leon, Justice Powell declared that if a magistrate
serves merely as a "rubber stamp" for police officers and is incapable of exercising ma-
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Although the Supreme Court in Malley briefly touched the issue of
magisterial misconduct, neither the majority nor the dissent fully ex-
plored the implications of ignoring the deficiencies in the warrant issu-
ing process. The Malley court declared that imposing the cost of an
unconstitutional arrest directly on the officer responsible will serve to
decrease the risk of unreasonable warrant requests.71  The present
scheme of absolute judicial immunity, 72 however, offers the magistrate
little incentive to carefully evaluate each warrant application.7 3
Because judicial evaluation of probable cause is the essential check
between the government and the citizen,74 the magistrate plays the piv-
otal role in the warrant issuing process. The irony in Malley is that
while the Court mentioned the problem of lax magisterial review of
warrant applications, the Court used that fault in the judicial system to
justify imposing more stringent requirements on police officers.75 The
Malley standard dictates that in order to protect themselves from sec-
tion 1983 liability, police officers should receive a legal education to
acquire the magistrate's skill of determining probable cause. The in-
feasibility of this proposition necessitates a hard look at task specializa-
tion in local courts.7 6 If one of the causes of unconstitutional arrests is
an overloaded docket, 77 state legislatures should consider creating a
magisterial position uniquely for evaluation of warrant applications.7 8
ture judgment, then the appropriate remedy is closer supervision or removal of the mag-
istrate instead of holding the police officer personally liable for the magistrate's poor
performance. Id.
71. Id. at 1099.
72. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges absolutely immune
when acting within their jurisdiction).
73. The judicial officers evaluating warrant applications are protected by a cloak of
immunity and, therefore, do not have to worry about the possible consequences of their
occasional carelessness. See generally McCoy, supra note 45, at 56-65.
74. 106 S. Ct. at 1102 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981)). See supra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the magistrate's duties.
75. See 106 S. Ct. at 1099. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
76. See generally McCoy, supra note 45 (discussing possible benefits of a specialized
system in which a judicial officer is appointed expressly for evaluating warrant
applications).
77. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
78. See McCoy, supra note 45, at 64-65. In most state courts, warrant-issuing mag-
istrates are also trial judges. Thus, a magistrate's time is divided up between pending
cases and warrant applications. This causes a delay in the warrant-issuing process and
increases the possibility of careless evaluation of warrant applications. See id. at 65.
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This magistrate would have no trial powers and could devote his time
to evaluating warrant applications and reviewing pending arrests with
police and prosecutors.79 Moreover, he would have the time and in-
centive to become an expert on fourth and fourteenth amendment
lawY0°
The Malley Court failed to recognize that the imposition of such
stringent standards could potentially deter police officers from making
arrests even in justified circumstances. In view of tort liability princi-
ples that spread the cost of injury to the public at large through cen-
tralized liability,8 1 the majority's ruling seems unjustified. To remedy
this disparity, Congress could adopt a system that would hold the gov-
ernmental entity commanding the police officer liable for unconstitu-
tional arrests.82 Municipal liability might best insure against further
section 1983 violations because the threat of liability would increase
the care with which government officials supervise their subordinates.
8 3
This option, however, would expose municipalities to damage liability
for the civil rights violations of their employees. This liability, in turn,
could seriously deplete the financial resources that municipalities
would otherwise use for public improvement.84
Whereas holding a municipality liable for the civil rights violations
of its employees will protect the employee and provide incentives for
cautious governmental administration, specialization in the courts will
best prevent violations of individuals' civil rights from occurring. Con-
79. Some European court systems already have task specialization of the type rec-
ommended herein. A juge d'instruction dossier, an "investigating magistrate," is a
courthouse worker who has almost exclusive responsibility for reviewing police evi-
dence and developing investigative files for pending arrests. This "investigating magis-
trate" is also responsible for testing cases for their adherence to constitutional norms.
Id. at 65 n.36.
80. See id. at 65.
81. See Comment, supra note 20, at 253 ("public policy dictates that the entity
which causes the loss should bear the loss"). The governmental entity behind the police
officer is better able to pay the costs of a § 1983 violation than the police officer, or even
the victim himself. Kates & Kouba, supra note 17, at 138.
82. Kates & Kouba, supra note 17, at 138 (strict municipal liability in § 1983 ac-
tions would encourage municipalities to prevent such actions by enforcing tightened
municipal operating procedure.
83. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, at 652 n.36 (1979).
84. See id. at 650-53 (Powell, J., dissenting) (municipal liability may paralyze gov-
ernmental action and render municipalities bankrupt). See also Kates & Kouba, supra
note 17, at 167.
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sequently, legislatures should vigorously promote task specialization in
the issuance of arrest and search warrants.
Joyce E. Levowitz
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